A transformed information environment, widening credibility gaps, and unfocused strategy are eroding America’s ability to shape the narratives that sustain its global influence
It is striking that many Iranian users on X have addressed this very same issue from the perspective of Iranian monarchists seeking to overthrow the terrorist Islamic Republic: the very important criticism that, in addition to appeasement of the regime and negotiation after negotiation—as if they were dealing with a normal government—President Trump and his team have ignored the will of the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people.
Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora, at least since the January massacres, has been the echo of the Iranian people through its weekly demonstrations, presenting Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, our only hope, as the leader of Iran’s National Revolution under the Lion and Sun. Yet the White House, following the isolationist camp, continues to engage diplomatically with our killers and pays no attention to the will of the Iranian people. Within this very diaspora, some Iranians were even constantly carrying photographs of Trump at their demonstrations. The President did not even use that as part of his own narrative in the narrative war.
For us Iranians, it is deeply frustrating that people like the late Lindsey Graham, like Netanyahu, recognized the true nature of this terrorist regime, while Trump did not.
For us Iranians, it is astonishing that in the realm of American politics, podcasters and politically inexperienced young people have come to replace seasoned policymakers as advisers.
And the Islamic Republic continues to have the upper hand in mainstream media as well as in lobbying, while the U.S. government—from Robert Malley to Trita Parsi—continues, once again, to move forward with forces close to the Islamic Republic.
A very timely analysis. What stands out to me is that memetic warfare is not simply about creating or spreading content; it is ultimately about shaping perception, credibility, and the interpretation of power.
From a field perspective, narratives become strategically powerful when they connect with an existing gap between what institutions say and what people experience. Once that credibility gap becomes sufficiently wide, even a relatively small meme, image, or cultural reference can acquire disproportionate strategic effect.
This also means that memetic warfare cannot be understood separately from political legitimacy and strategic communication. Military and economic power may shape the material environment, but the battle over how those actions are understood can determine whether power is perceived as legitimate, effective, or increasingly disconnected from reality.
The deeper lesson, in my view, is that influence cannot simply be manufactured. It has to be sustained by credibility.
— Wahidullah Noorzai
Former Senior ANCOP/ANP Officer | Strategic & Security Analyst
The article convincingly describes how cheaply and quickly hostile messages enter our information environment, but it skips the most important question: does it actually change what people think? That is never demonstrated. More likely, such memes and videos mainly reach those who already thought that way. People share them because they confirm an existing feeling, not because they cause a shift. The sharing, then, is more an expression than a formation, and that sharing is probably the actual function. This is precisely what McLuhan meant by "the medium is the message": the meaning lies not in the content of the meme, but in the form and the act of spreading it. What shapes us is not what the clip claims, but the fact that it is shared, remixed, and repeated within a system that runs on circulation. The message is the distribution. And that shifts the heart of the problem. It is not Iran that sows the division; that is done by a media landscape that rewards anger and distrust because that is where the attention and the earnings are. Iran, at most, makes opportunistic use of it. This is exactly why the democratic dilemma the article sketches breaks down: censorship undermines trust rather than restoring it, because it suppresses the message without removing the discontent beneath it. The real way out lies outside the article's frame: seriously addressing the underlying problems instead of massaging them away. And here McLuhan's title turns on itself. The line was first misprinted as "the medium is the massage," and he let the error stand, because the medium does not merely inform us, it kneads us, working on our perception before we notice. The same logic runs both ways. The medium massages the discontent in, while politics keeps trying to massage it away. That the second fails, decade after decade, is precisely why the discontent endures.
Especially against the background of reports that Putin is intensifying hybrid attacks on Europe.
When it comes to counterpropaganda, there are three important possibilities that need to be separated:
Trust - the author mentions this too. But not only trust in the state. Also trust in public figures who are part of the information ecosystem. In this sense, the advantages of a democratic state being attacked are obvious.
Digital hygiene - explanations and research on this can be just as convincing as ordinary hygiene campaigns or anti-smoking campaigns once were.
Platform algorithms - propaganda, just like unfair competition, is characterized by the coordination of large numbers of fake accounts. The technological superiority of democratic countries and legal regulation in this area can help identify such coordination.
It is striking that many Iranian users on X have addressed this very same issue from the perspective of Iranian monarchists seeking to overthrow the terrorist Islamic Republic: the very important criticism that, in addition to appeasement of the regime and negotiation after negotiation—as if they were dealing with a normal government—President Trump and his team have ignored the will of the overwhelming majority of the Iranian people.
Meanwhile, the Iranian diaspora, at least since the January massacres, has been the echo of the Iranian people through its weekly demonstrations, presenting Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, our only hope, as the leader of Iran’s National Revolution under the Lion and Sun. Yet the White House, following the isolationist camp, continues to engage diplomatically with our killers and pays no attention to the will of the Iranian people. Within this very diaspora, some Iranians were even constantly carrying photographs of Trump at their demonstrations. The President did not even use that as part of his own narrative in the narrative war.
For us Iranians, it is deeply frustrating that people like the late Lindsey Graham, like Netanyahu, recognized the true nature of this terrorist regime, while Trump did not.
For us Iranians, it is astonishing that in the realm of American politics, podcasters and politically inexperienced young people have come to replace seasoned policymakers as advisers.
And the Islamic Republic continues to have the upper hand in mainstream media as well as in lobbying, while the U.S. government—from Robert Malley to Trita Parsi—continues, once again, to move forward with forces close to the Islamic Republic.
A very timely analysis. What stands out to me is that memetic warfare is not simply about creating or spreading content; it is ultimately about shaping perception, credibility, and the interpretation of power.
From a field perspective, narratives become strategically powerful when they connect with an existing gap between what institutions say and what people experience. Once that credibility gap becomes sufficiently wide, even a relatively small meme, image, or cultural reference can acquire disproportionate strategic effect.
This also means that memetic warfare cannot be understood separately from political legitimacy and strategic communication. Military and economic power may shape the material environment, but the battle over how those actions are understood can determine whether power is perceived as legitimate, effective, or increasingly disconnected from reality.
The deeper lesson, in my view, is that influence cannot simply be manufactured. It has to be sustained by credibility.
— Wahidullah Noorzai
Former Senior ANCOP/ANP Officer | Strategic & Security Analyst
The article convincingly describes how cheaply and quickly hostile messages enter our information environment, but it skips the most important question: does it actually change what people think? That is never demonstrated. More likely, such memes and videos mainly reach those who already thought that way. People share them because they confirm an existing feeling, not because they cause a shift. The sharing, then, is more an expression than a formation, and that sharing is probably the actual function. This is precisely what McLuhan meant by "the medium is the message": the meaning lies not in the content of the meme, but in the form and the act of spreading it. What shapes us is not what the clip claims, but the fact that it is shared, remixed, and repeated within a system that runs on circulation. The message is the distribution. And that shifts the heart of the problem. It is not Iran that sows the division; that is done by a media landscape that rewards anger and distrust because that is where the attention and the earnings are. Iran, at most, makes opportunistic use of it. This is exactly why the democratic dilemma the article sketches breaks down: censorship undermines trust rather than restoring it, because it suppresses the message without removing the discontent beneath it. The real way out lies outside the article's frame: seriously addressing the underlying problems instead of massaging them away. And here McLuhan's title turns on itself. The line was first misprinted as "the medium is the massage," and he let the error stand, because the medium does not merely inform us, it kneads us, working on our perception before we notice. The same logic runs both ways. The medium massages the discontent in, while politics keeps trying to massage it away. That the second fails, decade after decade, is precisely why the discontent endures.
Excellent article on a very timely subject.
Especially against the background of reports that Putin is intensifying hybrid attacks on Europe.
When it comes to counterpropaganda, there are three important possibilities that need to be separated:
Trust - the author mentions this too. But not only trust in the state. Also trust in public figures who are part of the information ecosystem. In this sense, the advantages of a democratic state being attacked are obvious.
Digital hygiene - explanations and research on this can be just as convincing as ordinary hygiene campaigns or anti-smoking campaigns once were.
Platform algorithms - propaganda, just like unfair competition, is characterized by the coordination of large numbers of fake accounts. The technological superiority of democratic countries and legal regulation in this area can help identify such coordination.