In Summary
In many Latin American countries, ‘la mano dura’ policies are growing in popularity.
La mano dura is heavily reliant on the military, enabling leaders to keep their countries in a political stranglehold.
The Netherlands must look to the examples in Latin America and ensure that a tough stance on drug-related crime does not come at the expense of a structural approach.
BRICS-Brazil Update | In April, Ecuador will hold the second round of voting. The presidential elections in Ecuador symbolise a long-standing debate on the continent: can (drug-related) violence be tackled through a social approach or with an iron fist, la mano dura?
Although Colombia is often associated with cocaine, most exports to the Netherlands actually originate from Ecuador. Production, however, does take place mainly in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, whilst Ecuador has thus become the epicentre of exports and violence, with all the consequences that entails. In January 2025, 731 murders were recorded—almost one per hour—in a country with a population slightly smaller than that of the Netherlands.
In Dutch and other European ports, ever-larger quantities of cocaine are being intercepted with increasing frequency. This points to effective work by customs authorities, but certainly also to a sharp rise in exports. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, there is a global increase in demand. Secondly, there has been a sharp rise in supply. Thanks to genetic improvements and hybrid coca plants, as well as new chemical techniques that make extraction more efficient and produce a purer product, productivity has risen sharply.
At the same time, the neglect of farmers in the regions, the scaling back of the alternative crops programme (in Colombia), political instability (particularly in Peru and Bolivia), new smuggling routes and corruption are all contributing to an increase in supply. More successful policies in Colombia to restrict exports are creating a ‘waterbed effect’: a shift towards neighbouring Ecuador and other countries such as Costa Rica. Interestingly, Colombia has now clearly opted for a social agenda with Gustavo Petro, a former FARC guerrilla fighter, although Petro is facing political difficulties and calls for a tougher approach continue to be heard.
The incumbent president of Ecuador, Noboa, advocates the policy of la mano dura and, during his year and a half in office, has made extensive use of the state of emergency, imposing curfews and deploying the army on the streets and in prisons. Two weeks before the elections, which were won at the time by Noboa – the son of a banana billionaire and a Miami-born man – who, at 35, became the youngest president ever, a party leader and investigative journalist, Fernando Villavicencio, was murdered by members of a drug cartel during the election campaign. The Colombian perpetrator was shot dead at the scene and six other Colombian suspects were all murdered in prison. This is illustrative of the wave of violence and its foreign influences in Ecuador.
Opposition candidate Luisa González, who is associated with the ‘Correísmo’ movement of the socialist president Rafael Correa (2007–2017), has opted for a strategy that would combine a tough stance with social initiatives, particularly in poorer regions where the cartels wield significant influence.
The violence in Central America has a different origin, although drug cartels also have a strong presence here, currently particularly in Mexico. In El Salvador, the deportations of the many Salvadorans who had fled to the US as a result of a brutal civil war in the 1980s were the catalyst for further violence. Notorious gangs were formed in the US and subsequently continued their activities in Central America. Could the current deportations from the US to a wider range of countries have a similar effect in the long term?
La mano dura has its roots in the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, which are still viewed by many as a period of order and security, despite the curtailment of freedoms and the many victims. At present, the approach is strongly associated with El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele, and opinions on his success are deeply divided. On the one hand, murder rates in the country have fallen dramatically, and in that respect El Salvador has even become the safest country in the Western Hemisphere.
The fact that Central and South Americans are prepared to sacrifice some freedoms and democratic values in exchange for security may seem an understandable choice in the short term. That international organisations voice criticism regarding human rights is also understandable, but seems equally short-sighted and ineffective. Human rights rhetoric and finger-wagging will make little impression on those who have lost friends and family to gang violence. The narrative of la mano dura resonates. However, the question is whether there is a way back once la mano dura is fully implemented. Did the Salvadorans really have any choice but Bukele?
Not only because the elections may not have been entirely fair, but above all because the alternative might trigger a new wave of violence, partly due to the potential release of many detainees, some of whom were wrongfully imprisoned. In short, la mano dura keeps countries in a political stranglehold through heavy reliance on the police. This is accompanied by the usual authoritarian tendencies: the curtailment of press freedom, political interference in the judiciary and human rights violations. The largest prison on the continent was built to accommodate the enormous number of (men) who have been and continue to be arrested, often without a warrant or legal representation. Bukele is said to have been re-elected last year with some 83 per cent of the vote and, as a young millionaire, shares similarities with Ecuador’s Noboa.
An end to such a stranglehold will be felt here too, via our ports. Anarchy is not a solution; la mano dura is merely a temporary fix. As the consequences of drug trafficking are evident in the Netherlands, it is important to monitor the trend towards la mano dura and anticipate what lies ahead.
In very concrete terms, there are already attempts at upstream disruption, whereby efforts are being made to disrupt drug activities at source in the region. The Netherlands is primarily focused on the Caribbean and has, for example, ‘liaisons’ in Colombia. In this regard, the Netherlands could capitalise on political fluctuations and new policies in South and Central American countries.
Naturally, there is also a significant responsibility to tackle the demand side. The Netherlands must not hide behind the idea that it is merely a transit country and thereby downplay the problem. Mexico also hides behind that narrative and is now grappling with very significant interference by drug gangs in politics. Despite the major differences between Mexico and the Netherlands, it is nevertheless important to remain vigilant and avoid naivety.
Finally, the Netherlands would do well to keep a close eye on other examples of how drug-related crime is tackled and to learn from them. After all, the Netherlands is also known internationally as a ‘narco-state’. As drug-related crime becomes increasingly visible in society, the political and media discourse will also shift increasingly towards ‘la mano dura’-style solutions. This is already evident, with calls for a tougher approach. In this context, we must remain vigilant regarding drug dependency and the potential weakening of institutions and the rule of law. The Netherlands has waited too long to take genuine action. A tough approach must not stand in the way of a structural solution.
This article was translated, find the original here.