In Summary
Narrative delegitimisation enabled a virtually silent intervention in Venezuela. The abduction of Maduro drew hardly any criticism, in itself, from Latin American powers and Venezuela’s allies.
This regional powerlessness is a blow to Brazil’s ambitions to be a key player in a multipolar world order.
A possible future for Venezuela can be seen in the example of Puerto Rico: long-term administration rather than occupation, and the benefits without the burdens.
Latin America Regional Update | The abduction of Nicolás Maduro by the United States at the start of the new year came as a complete surprise to many. Although the confrontation with Venezuela certainly did not come out of the blue (see also the update: Is Venezuela part of the next proxy war?), the manner in which Maduro was arrested and taken away captured the public’s imagination. Gradually, a little more has become clear about the United States’ reasons and intentions, but above all, there are still many questions about Venezuela’s future.
Does his removal mark the culmination of a protracted process in which geopolitical, narrative and institutional factors converged? Or is it a schism and, as such, the start of long-term intervention by the United States? Could Venezuela face a similar administrative fate to that of Puerto Rico? In short, what can we expect for Venezuela’s future based on the lessons of the past?
Latin America is suddenly back in the spotlight. The Monroe Doctrine, which dates back more than two centuries – and which was initially directed against European colonialism but effectively establishes US control over the Americas – is thus very much alive again, and the message is clear: Latin America lies within the United States’ sphere of influence.
This development evokes fears of earlier periods of oppression by the United States and the installation of dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s of the Cold War, when left-wing dissidents in particular were murdered and tortured. The Puerto Rican band Calle 13 wrote the song Latinoamérica, which criticises colonisation and imperialism whilst celebrating the identity and pride of pan-Latin American culture and demonstrating resistance. The song begins as follows:
“I am… I am what they have left behind.
I am all that remains of what they have stolen.”
The build-up
For two decades, particularly under Hugo Chávez, Caracas stood as a counterweight to US hegemony and a symbol of the ‘pink tide’ of left-wing political leaders in the region. With economic and democratic decline came a decline in the narrative. This systematically lowered the moral and diplomatic threshold for external interference. The consistent linking of Venezuela to (drug-related) crime, violence, migration crises and humanitarian distress has ensured that the moral and diplomatic threshold for intervention has been lowered step by step.
Ultimately, Venezuela’s sovereignty had been so severely delegitimised that few countries or governments had any qualms about intervention with the potential for regime change. The relatively clinical operation, carried out without protracted military conflict, therefore did not result in a loss of face for the Trump administration, but rather became a symbol of strength and power.
Perhaps the lack of a narrative decline is the reason why Panama has not yet been taken. In the case of Venezuela, international reactions were largely absent, certainly where the operation itself was concerned, both from Venezuela’s allies and from countries in the region.
A political shift to the right has been underway in the region for some time, further eroding the ‘pink tide’ and leading to a pro-American reorientation. Javier Milei of Argentina, Nayib Bukele of El Salvador and the newly elected José Antonio Kast of Chile are probably the best-known and most radical examples, but Ecuador, Peru and Paraguay also illustrate the trend to a lesser extent. Not entirely surprisingly, these countries either applaud Trump’s actions in Venezuela or remain neutral.
The last bastions of a more left-wing order – the most radical example being Gustavo Petro of Colombia – were, however, more critical. Colombia is by far the country hosting the most refugees from Venezuela. Estimates vary, but generally the figures amount to nearly 3 million of the almost 8 million Venezuelans who have fled since the massive crisis and dictatorship began. Petro requested emergency meetings with the UN Security Council and the Organisation of American States and deployed troops to the border with Venezuela.
Brazil’s Lula and Mexico’s Sheinbaum also condemned the US action, but kept their remarks more abstract and diplomatic. Above all, this highlighted the powerlessness of the region’s largest countries and, in the case of the latter, the direct interests involved in not jeopardising reasonable relations with Trump. Consequently, the invasion and its aftermath deal a blow to the notion that Brazil and Mexico play a significant role in a multipolar world order and send a clear signal to the United States: no unchecked expansion in our ‘backyard’.
“I am Latin America
A people without legs, yet still walking” (Latinoamérica, Calle 13)
The future and oil
The silence shortly after the United States’ intervention in Venezuela can still be partly explained by the fact that there was some confusion about the exact motives and, in particular, the intentions regarding the regime. It is now clear that it is not regime change or the restoration of democracy and order, but direct interests that play the primary role in the United States’ future interference. In short, it’s all about Venezuelan oil.
Neighbouring Guyana, where the oil-rich region was under threat from Maduro, had already been taken over by the American oil companies ExxonMobil and Chevron. In Suriname too, where large offshore reserves of oil and gas have been discovered quite recently, the oil is being extracted by foreign companies, notably the French firm TotalEnergies and the American company APA. For this reason, Guyana and Suriname do not appear to be directly anticipating a similar scenario, despite their relatively large reserves of raw materials and very limited power. In Venezuela, by contrast, the oil had been fully nationalised.
However, the fact that Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserves – namely around 303 billion barrels and some 17 to 18 per cent of global proven reserves – does not mean that it represents exactly the same value. In the Orinoco Belt, the largest category of reserves is heavy crude oil. This oil is more difficult to extract and process and is therefore more expensive and more harmful to the environment and the climate. It is becoming increasingly clear that US oil giants are not particularly convinced about making massive investments in Venezuela, which has relatively very low production levels due to neglected infrastructure and economic sanctions.
The fact that the United States nevertheless has a strong strategic interest can be partly explained by the other countries that possess this type of oil to a greater or lesser extent, namely, in order of proven reserves: Canada, China, Russia, Iran and Kuwait. Iran stands out in particular, and the parallels – despite the many differences between Iran and Venezuela – in the regime’s narrative decline and the consequent systematic lowering of the threshold for direct intervention are striking.
“You can’t buy the sun
You can’t buy the rain
(We walk on)
(We mark the path)
You can’t buy my life
My country is not for sale” (Latinoamérica, Calle 13)
Regime
Despite the United States’ rhetoric regarding Maduro and his regime, little to nothing has happened so far in terms of regime change. Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez has taken office as interim president, meaning that, on paper, nothing has changed – although Rodríguez will, for the time being, comply with the United States. This is striking, as virtually no one recognises the regime as legitimate. Loyalists within the existing power structure, including military and security bodies, continue to retain considerable influence, leaving the political landscape fragmented; the opposition, led by figures such as María Corina Machado and Edmundo González, continues to call for recognition as democratic leaders and for free elections.
Through abstract terms of ‘transition’ – in which the US would also play an administrative role, though it is unclear what that role would be, and in which a specific timeframe would apply, though it is unclear what that timeframe would be – Maduro’s regime remains largely intact.
“Tough work, but with pride
Here we share: what’s mine is yours.
[…]
Operation Condor invading my nest
I forgive, but I never forget!” (Latinoamérica, Calle 13)
Puerto Rico as a model?
The long term therefore raises many questions. The severely restricted sovereignty is reminiscent of a potential US–Puerto Rico relationship. Formally, the state continues to exist, but its scope for policy-making is largely determined externally. Economic restructuring, security coordination and institutional reforms will take place within frameworks set by Washington. De facto, one could speak of a colony in modern guise.
Puerto Rico was annexed by the United States in 1898 following the Spanish–American War. Since then, the island has been an unincorporated territory. Puerto Ricans have been US citizens since 1917, but their political rights are fundamentally restricted. They are not allowed to vote in presidential elections, have no voting representation in Congress (only a non-voting delegate) and have no direct influence over federal legislation that does apply to the island. Crucial decisions on the budget, trade, defence and monetary policy are taken in Washington. This model, certainly without citizenship in the short term, may be attractive to the United States in Venezuela. It avoids the costs and risks of direct occupation, whilst offering maximum control over energy resources, migration flows and regional stability.
Conclusion
This broader development fits seamlessly within the logic of the Monroe Doctrine. Although the language has been modernised, the core remains unchanged: the Western Hemisphere is viewed as an exclusive sphere of influence in which external or regional competition for power is not tolerated. The removal of Maduro is therefore not an anomaly, but a contemporary reaffirmation of a strategic principle dating back almost two hundred years and the associated balance of power in the region.
Possible courses of action for the Netherlands and the EU
Strengthening regional cooperation: By pushing through the trade agreement with Mercosur (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay), the EU, as a geopolitical player, has embarked on a positive path towards building closer ties with strategic partners in Latin America. The actions of the United States to take direct control (and the potential reaction from other spheres of influence) create even greater urgency to press ahead with this. As well as being a necessity, this also presents opportunities, as everyone is eagerly seeking allies. In addition to Mercosur, Chile is also in the running.
Drawing a line: if NATO members and democratic countries are attacked
the liberal world order may collapse once and for all. It is unclear where the limit lies for the United States in safeguarding its own interests and expanding its influence and power. The EU and the Netherlands must try to anticipate a further reorientation of US policy. A consistent stance on international law and sovereignty – even when the strategic interests of allies are at stake – contributes both to drawing that line and to further cooperation with partners in the Global South.
This article was translated, find the original here.