In Summary
The US is (possibly) withdrawing from Europe – are there still Article 5 guarantees?
Can Europe fill the gap left by the US?
What should the Netherlands contribute in this regard?
Defence Regional Update | Although we are only at the very beginning of Trump’s (second) presidency, the consequences are already almost impossible to fathom. In a short space of time, the United States appears to have sided with Russia in Ukraine, and there are threats of the withdrawal of American troops from Europe and the closure of military bases – not to mention the dramatic events in the Oval Office.
At the same time, the Pentagon has begun mapping out massive defence cuts in order to ‘reprioritise’ the issues that matter to Trump – and Europe’s security does not appear to be one of them. It is highly questionable whether Europe can still count on the US in the event of war and whether the US will honour its obligations under Article 5 towards European NATO member states. In other words: Europe will have to defend itself. But is that even possible?
What does the US contribute to Europe’s security?
First and foremost: Russia is currently unable to attack Europe, as a large part of its armed forces is deployed in Ukraine. A more realistic risk is that a Trump-Putin ‘peace’ in Ukraine would enable Russia to rebuild its armed forces and, in a few years’ time, make a fresh attempt to subjugate Ukraine – and perhaps then immediately try to take a few other countries with it. A quick initial calculation shows that Europe would need to train and equip around 300,000 additional soldiers, as well as many thousands of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery pieces, in order to defend Europe – roughly 50 brigades (a combat unit comprising around 5,000 troops).
The estimated costs? Roughly 250 billion euros, or around 3.5 per cent of GDP. All this to strengthen the backbone of European defence, which is currently provided mainly by the US: heavy mechanised brigades, consisting of tanks and other armoured vehicles capable of effectively engaging large numbers of Russian equipment. Incidentally, this does not even take into account the other capabilities provided by the US, such as in the fields of intelligence (e.g. satellites) and training (e.g. for pilots). On paper, Europe has many times more military personnel and equipment than Russia currently has in Ukraine, but this is scattered across many different countries, consists of different types of equipment and is not centrally commanded, trained or equipped. Furthermore, ammunition stocks are low, there are many vacancies, and operational readiness is low following decades of budget cuts.
What the Netherlands has to offer
Given the scale of the challenges, it is essential not to base our reasoning on a percentage of GDP (“2 per cent for defence”) but first and foremost to determine what capabilities the Netherlands should provide, and then to allocate the appropriate funding accordingly.
For a relatively small country, the Netherlands currently provides a number of key capabilities. For instance, the Netherlands is investing in long-range missiles for both the navy and the air force, and the reintroduction of rocket artillery is an important addition to the army. Furthermore, the Netherlands possesses advanced air defence systems, both on land with Patriot installations and at sea through advanced radar systems and surface-to-air missiles on naval vessels.
At the same time, ground combat capability is limited: the Netherlands currently has only three brigades, of which just one consists of armoured and mechanised equipment, such as tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Furthermore, the tank battalion within this brigade is largely a German unit comprising 18 leased German Leopard 2 tanks. However, the procurement of 46 new Leopard 2 tanks will see the addition of a new Dutch tank battalion. In the event of a large-scale conflict with Russia, this would be the only unit capable of actually engaging Russian tank columns.
Setting priorities and making choices
With the withdrawal of the US (although, of course, a number of details still need to be finalised), the focus of European (and therefore also Dutch) defence seems to be shifting back towards the army. The roughly 50 new European brigades required would mean that the Netherlands – to begin with – would have to establish at least two new brigades, including tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery, trained personnel and other equipment. No easy task, but certainly not unachievable: after all, during the Cold War, the army had three divisions, each comprising three brigades, with every brigade containing one or two tank battalions totalling 913 (!) tanks and nearly 3,000 (!) armoured vehicles.
Now that the Netherlands has ordered new Leopards, the CV90 infantry fighting vehicles are being upgraded, and production of CV90s in the Netherlands is being set up for the Ukrainian armed forces as well, the time is more than ripe to improve the Army’s combat capability. However, this is only the beginning: in an increasingly unstable world, further strengthening of the armed forces is inevitable, both to protect trade routes vital to Europe and to safeguard partners on other continents. Replacing the US ‘muscle’ in Central and Eastern Europe is just one part of the challenges facing Europe.
For policymakers:
Establish a clear division of tasks at European level: not who can provide what, but who will provide what. The concrete starting point here should be what capabilities are needed to defend Europe against a large-scale Russian invasion, such as the one Ukraine endured in 2022. Ensure that, just as during the Cold War, there are clear agreements on who defends which part of Europe, including the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. This also means that European countries will have to station troops in, for example, the Baltic states, where approximately 50,000 European troops are required to effectively support the armed forces of the Baltic states in the event of a Russian invasion.
Recognise that establishing new units involves more than just recruiting personnel and procuring equipment: for instance, space must also be created to conduct large-scale manoeuvres; Ukraine has taught us the importance of drones for both reconnaissance and offensive roles; and improving short-range air defence is indispensable. The procurement of new systems for this purpose is therefore a step in the right direction.
Invest in autonomous European command, communications and intelligence infrastructure for defence. European armed forces cannot operate jointly if they are both ‘blind’ and ‘deaf’ due to a lack of satellites, connections and communications.
It is also essential to engage in dialogue on nuclear deterrence: without the US, France and the United Kingdom are the only NATO nuclear powers, but they possess a significantly smaller arsenal than Russia, and clear agreements are needed to deter Russian military ambitions through nuclear deterrence.
Seize the opportunity to standardise equipment, doctrine and training. European countries must be able to fight as a single armed force; fragmentation means weakness. Europe has 178 different major weapon systems, whilst the US has only 30. Greater standardisation, interoperability and procurement also mean lower costs.
Localise the production of equipment as much as possible, both to ensure short delivery times for spare parts and to guarantee independence from the US – although, realistically, there is not an obvious European alternative for every American system. To this end, look beyond Europe alone: South Korea and Japan, for example, both have advanced defence industries with export potential.
Work as quickly as possible to find solutions to the personnel shortages in the defence sector, first to bring existing units up to strength and then to staff new units and reserves. It is therefore positive that the Swedish model of conscription is being considered.