Turkey is undoubtedly important for Syria as a counterweight to Israel. Bibi expanded Israel’s occupation beyond the Golan Heights, and that is a major source of resentment for all Syrians. Russia cannot play that role. It has been weakened too much by the war in Ukraine. And its role in supporting Assad’s regime is unlikely to have been forgotten.
I think the fact that the bases can still be used by the Russians is a major diplomatic success for them. But probably not because of access to the Mediterranean - Russia’s fleet has been weakened by Ukrainian strikes. What matters to Putin is showing his own society that Russia still means something in the Middle East. Even though it no longer does.
It is also worth keeping in mind that the Syrian army is equipped mostly with Russian weapons, and maintaining them matters.
Even so, I would not be surprised if it turns out that Moscow gave Damascus more than it seems right now.
Thanks, really good points you raise. I do agree that keeping the bases is already a win for Moscow, especially after losing Assad. However, I’d still say the Mediterranean matters though, not only because of the fleet itself but because of Russia’s wider presence in Libya and Africa. And yes, the Russian weapons equipment point is important too. It gives Damascus a practical reason to keep some relationship with Moscow. I also think you’re right that we probably don’t know the full extent of what Russia offered Syria in return yet. Maybe that is the bigger question here: how much of this agreement is really about Russia preserving its influence, and how much is it about Damascus using what remains of that influence to its own advantage?
This is a really interesting piece. But one thing perhaps deserves some attention. How any current & future hostility between Israel & Turkey may play out in Syria. The last thing we need to see is Syria carrying out a role as ‘regional battlefield’ between Ankara & Jerusalem. Syria needs enough freedom of action to prevent this from happening. Can Russia provide this? Not under current conditions. I suppose this leaves Al-Sharaa exposed.
Thank you, this is a really interesting point. The possibility of Syria becoming an arena for growing Turkish-Israeli competition definitely complicates al-Sharaa’s attempt to regain room for action. I agree that Russia, at least under current conditions, seems unlikely to provide the kind of counterweight that would shield Damascus from that rivalry. It raises an important question about how much strategic autonomy al-Sharaa can actually achieve while Syria remains exposed to external powers.
Turkey is undoubtedly important for Syria as a counterweight to Israel. Bibi expanded Israel’s occupation beyond the Golan Heights, and that is a major source of resentment for all Syrians. Russia cannot play that role. It has been weakened too much by the war in Ukraine. And its role in supporting Assad’s regime is unlikely to have been forgotten.
I think the fact that the bases can still be used by the Russians is a major diplomatic success for them. But probably not because of access to the Mediterranean - Russia’s fleet has been weakened by Ukrainian strikes. What matters to Putin is showing his own society that Russia still means something in the Middle East. Even though it no longer does.
It is also worth keeping in mind that the Syrian army is equipped mostly with Russian weapons, and maintaining them matters.
Even so, I would not be surprised if it turns out that Moscow gave Damascus more than it seems right now.
Thanks, really good points you raise. I do agree that keeping the bases is already a win for Moscow, especially after losing Assad. However, I’d still say the Mediterranean matters though, not only because of the fleet itself but because of Russia’s wider presence in Libya and Africa. And yes, the Russian weapons equipment point is important too. It gives Damascus a practical reason to keep some relationship with Moscow. I also think you’re right that we probably don’t know the full extent of what Russia offered Syria in return yet. Maybe that is the bigger question here: how much of this agreement is really about Russia preserving its influence, and how much is it about Damascus using what remains of that influence to its own advantage?
This is a really interesting piece. But one thing perhaps deserves some attention. How any current & future hostility between Israel & Turkey may play out in Syria. The last thing we need to see is Syria carrying out a role as ‘regional battlefield’ between Ankara & Jerusalem. Syria needs enough freedom of action to prevent this from happening. Can Russia provide this? Not under current conditions. I suppose this leaves Al-Sharaa exposed.
Thank you, this is a really interesting point. The possibility of Syria becoming an arena for growing Turkish-Israeli competition definitely complicates al-Sharaa’s attempt to regain room for action. I agree that Russia, at least under current conditions, seems unlikely to provide the kind of counterweight that would shield Damascus from that rivalry. It raises an important question about how much strategic autonomy al-Sharaa can actually achieve while Syria remains exposed to external powers.