In Summary
Indonesia’s new membership, as announced by Brazil, is of significant symbolic value to BRICS, which is struggling with its legitimacy.
Indonesia’s accession and Brazil’s blocking of Venezuela’s membership can be seen as a sign that BRICS is not, in essence, anti-Western.
Reform of international organisations such as the United Nations, in line with the changing world order, appears to be one of the primary motives for joining BRICS.
BRICS/Brazil Update | Since the BRICS summit in Johannesburg in 2023, Indonesia has had the opportunity to become a full member of BRICS. Indonesia’s former president, Joko Widodo, postponed membership. Interestingly, on 6 January this year, the Brazilian chair announced that Indonesia is now formally a full member. Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo (hereinafter referred to as Prabowo) has thus, in the very first days of his presidency, immediately charted a clear new course, despite expectations that Widodo’s policies would largely be continued.
Indonesia’s membership of BRICS gives impetus to the idea that the Global South increasingly represents a united group of nations. With the accession of the fourth-most populous country, BRICS now represents approximately half of the world’s population. Whilst many Western countries viewed the accession of a group of nations last year with suspicion – on the grounds that a large proportion of them allegedly supported anti-Western sentiments – Indonesia is less likely to be labelled in such terms. This enhances the legitimacy of BRICS.
Brazil’s blocking of Venezuela’s membership at the recent BRICS summit in Kazan can also be seen as a sign that BRICS should not simply be viewed as anti-Western. The interests of the various countries are highly diverse, and joining different international forums can provide a foothold in the changing world order and an increasingly tense geopolitical climate.
At the same time, divisions within the countries themselves and between them are evident. For instance, Sugioni, Indonesia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that Indonesia does not take sides but wishes to be active on multiple fronts of development. Furthermore, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed its ambition to reform global institutions – read: the United Nations. Indonesia’s membership could therefore be seen as a sign that BRICS primarily offers a forum for giving the Global South a stronger voice.
Under Widodo, Indonesia also sought to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where the vast majority of countries, if not all members, could be labelled as Western. Although there has been a change of president and a new geopolitical strategy is being adopted as a result, membership of BRICS need not preclude membership of the OECD and other international organisations and forums. Indonesia could thus, much like Brazil and India, pursue a more multilateral strategy. In short, membership does not appear to be primarily ideologically motivated.
Indonesia’s membership could also open the door for other ASEAN members in South-East Asia to join. Malaysia and Thailand are reportedly keen to become members, and Vietnam is already a BRICS partner country.
Not least via the Strait of Malacca, one of the world’s most important trade routes, Indonesia is of great economic importance to the Netherlands and the European Union. Its strategic location and economic growth make the country highly interesting from a geopolitical perspective. Indonesia can act as a bridge between the Netherlands, BRICS and South-East Asia.
The fact that Indonesia does not make exclusive choices and also wishes to join Western-oriented forums, such as the OECD, offers an opportunity to develop joint policies. By recognising and acknowledging Indonesia’s pragmatic multilateral approach, the Netherlands can position itself as a mediating and supportive partner in a world order that is becoming increasingly multipolar.